Abstract-Telecommunications networks, and in particular optical WDM networks, are vulnerable to large-scale failures in their physical infrastructure, resulting from physical attacks (such as an electromagnetic pulse attack) or natural disasters (such as solar flares, earthquakes, and floods). Such events happen at specific geographical locations and disrupt specific parts of the network, but their effects cannot be determined exactly in advance. Therefore, we provide a unified framework to model network vulnerability when the event has a probabilistic nature, defined by an arbitrary probability density function. Our framework captures scenarios with a number of simultaneous attacks, when network components consist of several dependent subcomponents, and in which either a or a protection plan is in place. We use computational geometric tools to provide efficient algorithms to identify vulnerable points within the network under various metrics. Then, we obtain numerical results for specific backbone networks, demonstrating the applicability of our algorithms to real-world scenarios. Our novel approach allows to identify locations that require additional A. Efrat is with the Department of Computer Science, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA (e-mail: alon@cs.arizona.edu).
I. INTRODUCTION
T ELECOMMUNICATION networks are crucial for the normal operation of all sectors of our society. During a crisis, telecommunication is essential to facilitate the control of physically remote agents, provide connections between emergency response personnel, and eventually enable reconstitution of societal functions. However, telecommunication networks rely heavily on physical infrastructure (such as optical fibers, amplifiers, routers, and switches), making them vulnerable to physical attacks, such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, as well as natural disasters, such as solar flares, earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods [12] , [20] , [21] , [54] , [55] .
Physical attacks or disasters affect specific geographical areas and will result in failures of neighboring components. Therefore, it is important to consider their effects on the physical (fiber) layer as well as on the (logical) network layer. Increasingly, networks use a shared infrastructure to carry voice, data, and video simultaneously. Thus, failures in the this infrastructure will lead to a breakdown of vital services.
Although there has been significant research on network survivability, most previous works consider a small number of isolated failures or focus on shared risk groups (e.g., [10] , [17] , [36] , [41] , [50] , [57] , and references therein). On the other hand, work on large-scale attacks focused mostly on cyber-attacks (viruses and worms) (e.g., [9] , [23] , and [34] ). In contrast, we consider events causing a large number of failures in a specific geographical region.
This emerging field of geographically correlated failures has started gaining attention only recently [2] , [26] , [27] , [38] - [40] , [46] , [47] , [55] . However, unlike most of the recent work in this field, we focus on probabilistic attacks and on multiple simultaneous attacks. One example of such a scenario is shown in Fig. 1 which depicts the fiber backbone operated by a major US network provider [44] and two attacks with probabilistic effects (the link colors represent their failure probabilities).
The effects of physical attacks can rarely be determined exactly in advance. The probability that a component is affected by the attacks depends on various factors, such as the distance from the attack's epicenter to the component, the topography of the surrounding area, the component's specifications, and even Fiber backbone operated by a major US network provider [44] , and an example of two attacks with probabilistic effects (the link colors represent their failure probabilities).
its location within a building or a system. 1 In this paper, we consider probability functions that are nonincreasing functions of the distance between the epicenter and the component. We assume these functions have a constant description complexity and allow them to be either continuous or discontinuous (e.g., histograms). Then, we develop algorithms that obtain the expected vulnerability of the network. Furthermore, while [26] , [27] , [38] - [40] , [46] , [47] , and [55] consider only a single event, our algorithms allow the assessment of the effects of several simultaneous events.
We focus on wavelength-routed WDM optical networks, especially at the backbone [41] , [50] . We model the network as a graph, embedded in the plane, in which each node corresponds to an optical cross-connect (OXC) and each link corresponds to an optical fiber (which are usually hundreds or thousands of kilometers long). Along each link, there are amplifiers, which are spaced out approximately equally and are crucial to traffic delivery on the fiber. Data are transmitted on this graph on lightpaths, which are circuits between nodes. While lightpaths can be established by the network dynamically, lightpath provisioning is a resource-intensive process that is usually slow. If many links fail simultaneously (as in the case of a physical attack or a large-scale disaster), current technology will not be able to handle very large-scale reprovisioning (see for example, the CORONET project [14] ). Therefore, we assume that lightpaths are static, implying that if a lightpath is destroyed, all the data that it carries are lost. We note that our results are applicable to any network in which end-to-end paths are static and known in advance. This includes, for example, MPLS networks without label swapping at intermediate nodes.
We also consider networks that are protected by a dedicated path protection plan. Under such plans, every (primary) lightpath has a predefined backup lightpath on which data can be transmitted if the primary lightpath fails. Protection plans are precomputed before a failure event, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that they can be applied even after large-scale failures. Common approaches include or dedicated protection plans (see [41] and [50] ). Conceptually, in the protection plan, the data are sent twice along primary and backup lightpaths, implying that data are lost only when both lightpaths fail simultaneously. A dedicated protection, on the other hand, allows using a backup lightpath for low-priority traffic. Once the primary lightpath fails, traffic is shifted to the backup lightpath, and the low-priority traffic is disregarded.
Finally, we consider networks with dynamic restoration capabilities, i.e., where traffic may be dynamically rerouted in the event of an attack to avoid data loss. In general, devising efficient restoration algorithms, especially when required to handle large-scale failures, is a challenging task. Dynamic restoration schemes are more efficient in utilizing network capacity, but have slower recovery time and often cannot guarantee quality of restoration. With the current technology, large-scale dynamic restoration is mostly infeasible. However, this capability will emerge in future optical networks [14] .
We note that, in between dedicated path protection and fully dynamic restoration, there are other protection techniques that trade between the robustness of the network and the complexity of the technique (cf. [41] for a complete survey of these techniques). In this paper, we focus only on the two endpoints of this scale, while we leave how to adapt our proposed algorithms to more sophisticated techniques for future research.
Our goal is to identify the most vulnerable locations in the network, where vulnerability is measured either by expected number of failed components or by the expected total data loss. Our model allows for the consideration of failure probabilities of compound components by evaluating the effect of the attack on their subcomponents (e.g., the failure probability of a fiber, due to failure of some amplifiers). We consider the vulnerability of the network in terms of three measures: 1) expected component damage: the expected number of network components directly damaged by attacks or the expected amount of traffic lost due to the attacks; 2) average two-terminal reliability: the expected number of node pairs in the network that are able to communicate post-attack; and 3) expected maximum flow: the maximum post-attack flow.
We first develop algorithms for a single-attack scenario under the first two vulnerability measures outlined above. Our algorithms provide a tradeoff between accuracy and running time; we can provide arbitrarily small errors, albeit with high running time. Although these algorithms have to be executed offline in preparation for disasters, efficiency is important as numerous options and topologies need to be considered. Moreover, our algorithms also work under deterministic attack effects and achieve better results than the prior ones [39] .
Next, we consider the case of simultaneous attacks under the vulnerability measure of expected component damage and provide approximation algorithms for computing the most vulnerable set of locations. This problem is hard not only due to its probabilistic nature, but also due to the combinatorial hardness of the deterministic problem.
For networks with protection plans, we provide approximation algorithms to identify pairs of vulnerable locations that will have a high effect on both primary and backup paths. For future networks with dynamic restoration capability, network resilience can be measured in terms of the expected maximum flow measure. However, we show that computing this measure is #P-Complete and hence cannot be found in any reasonable time. We discuss options for mitigating this evaluation barrier.
Finally, we provide experimental results demonstrating the applicability of our algorithms to real backbone networks. Among other things, we show that even when the approximation algorithms only guarantee low accuracy (thereby having low running time), the results are very close to optimal. This would allow checking various scenarios and settings relatively fast.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are fourfold. 1) This is the first paper to present a general probabilistic model for geographically correlated failures, as well as efficient approximation algorithms for finding the most vulnerable locations in the network under two measures. Our algorithms trade accuracy with efficiency, where we can provide arbitrarily small errors, albeit with high running time. In addition, we provide the first set of algorithms that deal with simultaneous attacks. 2) We provide algorithms that take into account precomputed protection plans. 3) For networks with dynamic restoration capabilities, the network resilience corresponds to the maximum post-attack flow. We show that computing this measure is #P-Complete and discuss options for mitigating this evaluation barrier. 4) Importantly, this paper demonstrates that geometric techniques can significantly contribute to our understanding of network resilience. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related work, and Section III states the network model and the problem. We present in Section IV algorithms for analyzing network vulnerability by a single location and extend them to multiple attacks in Section V. We study the effect of protection and restoration plans in Sections VI and VII. We present experimental results in Section VIII and conclude and discuss future work in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Network survivability and resilience is a well-established research area (e.g., [10] , [41] , [50] , [57] , and references therein). However, most of the previous work in this area, and in particular in the area of physical topology and fiber networks (e.g., [17] and [36] ), focused on a small number of fiber failures (e.g., simultaneous failures of links sharing a common physical resource, such as a cable, conduit, etc.). Such correlated link failures are often addressed systematically by the concept of shared risk link group (SRLG) [29] . Additional works explore dependent failures, but do not specifically make use of the causes of dependence [33] , [51] , [53] .
In contrast with these works, we focus on failures within a specific geographical region (e.g., [11] , [21] , and [54] ), implying that the failed components do not necessarily share the same physical resource. To the best of our knowledge, geographically correlated failures have been considered only in a few papers and under very specific assumptions [26] , [27] , [38] - [40] , [46] , [55] . In most cases, the assumption is that the failures of the components are deterministic and that there is a single failure. Perhaps closest to this paper are the problems studied in [11] , [18] , [19] , [39] , [47] , and [52] . In particular, Neumayer et al. [39] recently obtained results about the resilience of fiber networks to geographically correlated failures when attacks have a circular area of effect in which links and nodes may fail. However, they only consider a single-attack scenario with deterministic effects. Rahnamay-Naeini et al. [45] , on the other hand, consider a stochastic setting with multiple attacks. However, unlike our paper, they deal with random attack locations and not with probabilistic effects of a failure on nearby components.
Another closely related theoretical problem is the network inhibition problem [42] , [43] , in which the objective is to minimize the value of a maximum flow in the graph, where there is a cost associated with destroying each edge, and a fixed budget is given for an orchestrated attack (namely, removing a set of edges whose total destruction cost is less than the budget). However, previous works dealing with this setting and its variants (e.g., [13] and [43] ) did not study the removal of (geographically) neighboring links.
Notice that when the logical (i.e., IP) topology is considered, widespread failures have been extensively studied [23] , [34] . Most of these works consider the topology of the Internet as a random graph [9] and use percolation theory to study the effects of random link and node failures on these graphs. These studies are motivated by failures of routers due to attacks by viruses and worms rather than physical attacks.
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The optical network is represented as a graph , where is a finite set of nodes in the plane, and is a set of links. We assume that each link is a straight line segment. Recall that each node corresponds to an OXC and each link corresponds to an optical fiber. Each link has a capacity . A lightpath is a path in ; let be the amount of data transmitted over per unit of time.
In certain types of attacks, links are not affected directly. Recall that each link has a sequence of amplifiers. A link becomes unusable if any of the amplifiers becomes unusable. In such a case, we model amplifiers also as nodes of , and the portions of a link between two adjacent amplifiers are considered edges. We consider nodes and edges of as simple components, and lightpaths as compound components. A link is a simple or compound component, depending on whether it is regarded as a single edge of or a sequence of amplifiers.
The input is a set of network components; each component has an associated weight indicating either lightpath traffic or link capacity.
A. Probabilistic Attack Model
An attack induces a spatial probability distribution on the plane, specifying the damage probability at each location (see Fig. 2 ). First consider simple components. We define the probability distribution function . Given an attack location and , is the probability that is affected by an attack at . Let be the Euclidean distance between and . 2 We assume is nonincreasing of and of constant description complexity. 3 We allow to be discontinuous, e.g., a piecewise-constant function (histogram). For a fixed , we use the function to denote its probability distribution function, as the function of the location of attack. Here are some examples of : In the deterministic setting, is 1 if , and 0 otherwise, for some parameter . Alternatively, one could use a more sophisticated function, for example, where depends on the distance from to or the length of the portion of link within the attack radius, which also decreases with distance. In many applications, is given or can be computed as a function of the distance from to . Two examples of that we use in our experimental results are the following.
• decreases linearly with the Euclidean distance, e.g., (the circular area of effect is similar to the geometric models in [39] , [46] ).
• decreases exponentially with , e.g., Gaussian distribution for constants , chosen appropriately to normalize the distribution. For a compound component composed of a sequence of simple components , we define its probability of being damaged by an attack at , , to be the probability that at least one of its simple component if damaged, i.e., (1) Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate cases where decreases exponentially with the distance for both types of components. A simpler definition of the probability of failure of is , where for some fixed parameter . For networks with protection plans (see Section VI), we assume that data are lost, if and only if both the primary and backup lightpaths are affected.
Given and a fixed integer , our goal is to find a set of locations so that simultaneous attacks at have the highest expected impact on the network. We consider three measures of impact of on the network: 1) expected component damage; 2) average two-terminal reliability; and 3) expected maximum flow.
B. Expected Component Damage
For a set of attack locations , let denote the expected total weight of failed components in (see the example in Fig. 4 ). By linearity of expectation, we get
, we set For a given integer , let and . The weight of each component enables us to define various measures in a unified manner: If is the set of amplifiers and is set to 1 (for all ), then is the expected number of failed amplifiers. Similarly, if is the set of fibers and for any fiber , ( 's capacity), then yields the expected capacity loss of attacks in . Finally, if is the set of lightpaths and , then is the expected loss in traffic, unless there is a protection (or restoration) plan in place. It is important to notice that, by linearity of expectation, corresponds to the expected value of the measure under consideration, regardless of any dependency between the various components in . Therefore, even in the extreme situations in which two components share the same physical resource (e.g., lightpaths that share the same fiber or fibers that share the same conduit), one can evaluate by considering each component separately.
When components are points in the plane (that is, amplifiers or OXCs) and , the problem is related to the Fermat-Weber problem [22] , [35] (i.e., finding a point that minimizes the average distance to a given set of points). However, the approximate solutions for the Fermat-Weber problem and our problem can be quite different.
C. Average Two-Terminal Reliability
Given a set of probabilities of failure on the network components (induced by the attacks at locations ), the two-terminal reliability for a given node pair in the network is the probability that they remain connected after the attack. The average two-terminal reliability, denoted by is the expected number of node-pairs that remain connected after the attack. Formally (3) where is the probability that is connected to given the set of attack locations. The quantity measures the network's post-attack connectivity. For an integer , let and . Given probabilities of failure on links/nodes in a network, the problems of computing the two-terminal reliability (the probability that a specific pair of nodes is connected) and all-terminal reliability (the probability that some pair of nodes is disconnected) are well-known intractable problems [16] indicating that our problem is intractable as well. In the case of the all-terminal reliability problem, there exists a randomized fully polynomial-time approximation scheme [30] , [31] , but the problem is significantly different from our problem.
D. Expected Maximum Post-Attack Flow
This quantity measures the maximum flow in the network once the components have failed between predetermined source and destination nodes. This is useful to determine the location maximizing data loss in networks with dynamic restoration capabilities (which reroute traffic to avoid data loss). We show that the problem of finding such a location is intractable.
IV. ASSESSING VULNERABILITY TO A SINGLE ATTACK
In this section, we present algorithms for computing the vulnerability of a set of simple or compound components to a single attack. Section IV-B describes an approximation algorithm for computing the maximum expected damage by a single attack for the case of simple components, Section IV-C extends this algorithm to compound components, and Section IV-D describes approximation algorithms for computing a location minimizing average two-terminal reliability. Our algorithms have a tunable parameter providing a tradeoff between accuracy and efficiency. We note that in order to measure the performance of our algorithms, we introduce other parameters but these are not inputs to the algorithm. We begin by introducing two geometric concepts, which will be used by the algorithms.
Arrangement: Let be a set of (simple) geometric regions (e.g., disks, triangles, hippodromes) in ; , is the total number of its vertices, edges, and faces. Since is a planar graph, this quantity is proportional to the number of edges. In the worst case, provided that any pair of boundaries intersect in points, but in our cases it will be much smaller-closer to . Let be the planar dual graph of -its nodes (resp. edges, faces) are the faces (resp. edges, nodes) of . We label each edge of with the region of whose boundary contains the corresponding dual edge of [24, p. 44] . See [6] for details on arrangements.
Let be a weight function. For a point , we define its depth with respect to and to be If for all , then is the number of regions of containing . We set to be the maximum depth and denote the maximum number of regions containing a point by . Superlevel Sets: Let be a bivariate function. For a value , we define the -superlevel set of to be the closure of the set . If is continuous, then for all points on the boundary of the -superlevel set. Given two parameters and , we define Given and a simple component , let be the -superlevel set of . Let . Since we have assumed to be a nonincreasing function of distance from , the two following properties hold.
1) For all , is a simply connected region and . Hence, is a set of "nested" faces; see Fig. 2 . 2) Let be two points lying in the same face of . If lie in the outermost (unbounded) face, then , otherwise .
A. Expected Damage for Simple Components
Let be a set of weighted simple components [ is a set of links or a set of nodes (amplifiers)], let be the weight of , and let be a parameter. We describe two algorithms for computing a point such that
. We first describe our basic algorithm MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION, which is a Las Vegas algorithm to compute . Then, we present a faster Monte Carlo algorithm, albeit with a slight probability of finding a point whose induced damage is less than . MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION is a building block in our other algorithms for more sophisticated scenarios.
MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION-A Las Vegas Algorithm: The algorithm, whose running time is, in practice, , has the following four main steps: 1) Superlevel sets generation for each component , taking into account the approximation parameter . 2) Computation of the corresponding arrangement. This procedure is randomized with guaranteed expected running time. The arrangement induces a function approximating , which is constant within each face. 3) Efficient computation of for each face. 4) MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION returns an arbitrary point in the face whose is maximal. We turn now to the details of each step and prove the correctness of the algorithm. Without loss of generality, we assume that for all and that . If necessary, we scale the weights and probability distribution functions so that this may be true.
We set , and . Note that . Set for all and . We assume that the superlevel sets of different components intersect transversally, i.e., if two superlevel sets intersect, there always exists a region adjacent to the intersection points. We compute and its dual graph . For each , we define a new function
Set (5) Note . The former takes expected time (see [6] ). Note that is plus the number of pairs of superlevel sets in whose boundaries intersect. Let denote the number of such pairs in for a given parameter . In the worst case, , but in practice it is closer to . We conclude the following. Theorem 1: Let be a set of simple components, let be a probability function defined for the components in , and let be a parameter. Then, a point can be computed in expected time such that . Monte Carlo Algorithm: We now describe a faster Monte Carlo algorithm to compute such a point (the exact running time of the algorithm depends on the type of simple components considered; see Theorem 2). We do this by formulating the problems as computing a point of maximum depth in a set of weighted regions and adapting the algorithms of Agarwal et al. [5] or Aronov and Har-Peled [7] . and are as above. We define a weight function as follows. For a superlevel set , we define if otherwise. In view of Lemma 5, the point can be computed by doing an exponential search, as described in [7] . There are two nontrivial steps: 1) choosing the multiset ; 2) a depth threshold procedure that determines whether . If so, then return a point such . Recall that we do not compute the set explicitly. We observe that the number of copies of chosen in follows a binomial distribution with parameters and . So we draw a value in time and associate as the weight of . If , we ignore . Let be the resulting subset, and let be the resulting multiset. Then, for any point , . We can use the procedure described in [1] and [7] to check whether . The expected running time of these procedures is , where is the number of vertices in whose depth with respect to (i.e., depth w.r.t. ) is at most . Since for all superlevel sets in , is bounded by the number of vertices whose unweighted depth is at most . Using the argument in Clarkson and Shor [15] (see also [49] ), it can be shown that , where is the maximum number of vertices on the boundary of the union of a subset of superlevel sets in . If is a set of nodes, then , but if is a set of links, then can be in the worst case even though it is in practice. Since the decision procedure is invoked times, the overall running time of this procedure is . Lemmas 2-4 imply that . Indeed
Hence, we obtain the following theorem. Theorem 2: Let be a set of simple components, a probability distribution function, and be a parameter. A point can be computed in expected time such that with high probability , where is the parameter as defined above and its value lies between and .
B. Expected Damage for Compound Components
Let be a set of compound components, and let be a parameter. We wish to compute a point such that
. We can use the algorithm described for simple components, but the difficulty is that a superlevel set of is not a simply connected region of constant size-its boundary may be disconnected and may have too many edges; see Fig. 3 . Thus, computing a superlevel set of is expensive. Hence, we use a slightly different approach. Let be the set of simple components in the compound components of . Set . We say that a simple component is affected by an attack at a location if , otherwise we say that an attack at location has no affect on of . For a compound component , be the maximum number of simple components in that can be affected by an attack at some location, and let .
In practice, is a constant, though it may be as large as in the worst case. We set , . For each , let , and , and let , . Next, let be the same as in (4), and we now define:
Note that for any , if a point , then is not affected by an attack . We compute , compute for each face of , and return a point from a face that maximizes the value of . The total time taken by this algorithm is . The correctness of the algorithm follows from the following two lemmas. Using the above lemma and following the proof of Lemma 2, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1: .
Putting everything together, we obtain the following theorem. Theorem 3: Let be a set of compound components, let be the set of simple components in them, and let . Let be a probability distribution function, and let be a parameter. A point such that can be computed in expected time time, where is the maximum number of simple components of a component in that are affected by an attack and is the same as defined above.
We note that in the worst case and , but in practice is a small constant and . Furthermore, we can also use the Monte Carlo algorithm by sampling components in . However, it is hard to prove an improved bound on its running time because the complexity of superlevel sets can be large.
C. Average Two-Terminal Reliability
Let be a set of simple components, and let be a parameter. We describe an algorithm for computing a point such that (as defined in Section III). Our algorithm follows the same paradigm as in Sections IV-B and IV-C: 1) compute a set of superlevel sets; 2) compute for a point in each face of their arrangement; and 3) return a point with lowest . We make two assumptions on the effects of the attacks. A1) We assume a local attack whose range is limited to , which is small compared to the network's environment size. Formally, we assume that an attack at can only affect a small number of components, i.e., if for an attack at , , then . We assume to be a constant. In the context of this section, we call the maximum depth (note that this is different from the weighted depth defined in Section IV). A2) An attack on the network cannot destroy any component with very low or very high probability: If a component has a probability smaller than to fail (or survive), we assume that this is indeed the case. More formally, for an attack at affecting a component , we assume that is either 0 or 1 or lies in the interval . For each component , we construct the -superlevel set of where and denote this by . Note that, by A2, for every location outside , takes the value 0. Let and denote the arrangement of . We call the coarse arrangement. In every face of , the set of components in that have positive probability of failure stays the same. We denote this set by . Note that . At a higher level, the algorithm traverses the faces of so that, at each face , we may maintain the connected components of . For more details on how this may be done, we refer the reader [24, Ch. V] in which a procedure for performing this traversal efficiently is described.
At each face, we construct a fine arrangement in a manner similar to Sections IV-B and IV-C. We set , , and compute . For a component , let denote the -superlevel set of , and let denote the -superlevel set of . Let , and let . By the properties of superlevel sets, for all , and are simply connected regions, and (similarly, ). Thus, the arrangement is a set of "nested" faces. In each case, we choose and such that . Therefore, . Let be a face of a fine arrangement contained inside a face of the coarse arrangement . Recall that at face of , we maintain the set of connected components of . At a face of , the algorithm traverses the faces of inside by performing a depth-first search on the dual graph of similar to the algorithm in Section IV-B. At each face , we compute the probabilities of all possible failure scenarios of components (since , there are possible such scenarios corresponding to each subset of failing). For each scenario, we insert the components that are not failed into the set of connected components of and compute the number of pairs of nodes connected. A weighted sum over all scenarios with the weights corresponding to the probabilities gives the value of . Finally, the algorithm reports the minimum over all faces. We refer the reader to [24, Ch. V] for the complete details of this procedure.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from the following lemma. Consider a face of contained in a face of and a single scenario of failure of components in where only the components in a set fail. Furthermore, we denote by , the probability of this scenario taking place when the attack is at a point . since the maximum depth is and is a set of pseudo-disks (see [15] and [48] ). For each face of , the time spent in computing is exponential in (since we examine failure scenarios of ) and independent of (since is independent of ). The traversal of the faces of may be accomplished in time steps for each of which we need to traverse the fine arrangement (see [24, Ch. V] for full details). Thus, the total time for the algorithm is where is exponential in and independent of . Theorem 4: Under assumptions A1 and A2, given a set of simple components, a point such that
, where is the location that minimizes , can be computed in time. Here, is independent of , but exponential in the maximum depth .
V. ASSESSING VULNERABILITY TO MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS
We now consider scenarios in which attacks may happen simultaneously. Our goal is therefore to identify the set of locations, for which is maximized over all possible choices of locations. In general, finding this set is NP-hard since maximizing the value of is a generalization of the wellknown maximum set cover problem [28] . Nevertheless, we show that the function satisfies two key properties monotonicity and submodularity, which are used to develop an approximation algorithm. Again, as before, this approximation algorithm has a tunable parameter that provides a tradeoff between the approximation factor and running time.
At a high level, the greedy algorithm works in iterations. At each iteration, we choose a location for an attack. Let be the set of locations chosen after iterations. At iteration , we pick the location that has the highest impact in terms of expected component damage given that we have already chosen . In order to quantify this impact, we define the notion of revenue of a location given , which is denoted by and defined as follows:
A perfect greedy algorithm would pick a point that maximizes the revenue over all points . However, implementing the greedy algorithm exactly may be possible for certain functions (e.g., square of the Euclidean distance), but in general it might be difficult. Thus, our approximate greedy algorithm finds a location such that . Notice that , where . Thus, the approximate greedy procedure may be implemented using the algorithms from in Section IV after modifying the weights of the components to (instead of ). Let be the set of locations that maximizes over all possible . We now show that satisfies the key properties: monotonicity and submodularity. These two properties immediately imply that a perfect greedy algorithm achieves a -approximation [37] . Since our algorithm is only approximately greedy, this results in an overall approximation factor of [25] , for any . Monotonicity intuitively means that the expected damage only increases with number of attacks. Formally, is monotonically nondecreasing, i.e., , for any set (this stems from the fact that , for any ). also exhibits the "law of diminishing returns" property or submodularity: For a given attack and two sets of attacks and such that , the revenue of is lower with respect to than with respect to . The following lemma captures this property.
Lemma 9: is a submodular function. Namely, for any two set of points and , such that , and any point , , i.e., . Proof: If , and the proof is trivial. If , and . Since for any , the claim follows. It is important to note that our proof holds for both types of components (simple and compound), and hence the greedy algorithm works for both cases. Clearly, our algorithm takes where is the time required to perform each step, i.e., the running time of MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION from Sections IV-B and IV-C. Thus, in practice, for a set of simple components, the running time would be , and for a set of compound components such that , the running time would be . Theorem 5: Let be a set of simple or compound components, let be a probability function defined for the simple components in , and let be a parameter. A set of points such that can be found in time where is the time required for finding a single location maximizing .
VI. NETWORKS WITH A PROTECTION PLAN
In networks with a protection plan in place at time of deployment, the determination of paths (both primary and backup) during design time often takes geographical correlation into account. The primary and backup lightpaths tend to be fiber-disjoint or even to be part of different SRLGs. For example, the fibers should not be close physically. Thus, it is likely that a reasonable protection plan will cope with a single attack. In this section, we evaluate the resilience of a protection plan to two simultaneous attacks.
Formally, we are given a set of pairs of lightpaths , where and are the primary and backup paths. Let and be respectively the high-priority and low-priority traffic on these lightpaths (for protection, is always 0). Thus, one loses when either or fails, or if both fail at once. We may consider three possible events at which there is a loss of traffic: 1) fails and does not fail, denoted by ; 2) does not fail and fails, denoted by ; and 3) both and fail, denoted by . Given two attack locations and , the probabilities of the three events are as follows:
where, denotes . Hence, the expected loss on the th pair is given by (6) For the entire network, we get . We next show how to find locations such that approximates , the maximum expected loss over all pairs of locations. Notice that one can also measure the worst-case vulnerability of the protection plan by the value of and use this value to compare the resilience of alternative plans. The algorithm proceeds in a manner similar to MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION in Section IV. First, we scale the values of and for every pair such that . Next, similar to Section IV-C, we choose where is the maximum number of simple components in any path (primary or backup) and is a constant whose choice is described later. We also choose such that , where is the sum of the lengths of all paths. Note that . With these values, we compute and compute the arrangement of superlevel sets of both and for all simple components based on (similar to Section IV-D).
The approximation factor of both and for a single path follows similar to Lemma 7. Now, we compute the value for every pair of faces of where and may be located and pick the pair that maximizes , say . Since there is at most a multiplication of four terms in (6), we choose the constant needed for determining in such a manner that . With this choice, following the proof of Lemma 2, we may show that the . The running time of the algorithm is quadratic in the size of the arrangement.
Theorem 6: Let be a set of lightpath pairs designating the protected paths, let be the constituent simple components, and let . Let be a probability function defined for the simple components in , and let be a parameter. A set of two points such that can be found in time , where is the maximum number of simple components in any lightpath and is the complexity of the arrangement of superlevel sets of .
VII. NETWORKS WITH RESTORATION ALGORITHMS
In a network with dynamic restoration capabilities, where traffic may be rerouted dynamically based on failed components, the optimal quality of restoration (in terms of post-attack traffic carried by the network between predetermined source nodes and destination nodes) is the maximum flow of the residual network. Therefore, finding the most vulnerable location in such a setting is equivalent to finding the location whose corresponding attack minimizes the expected maximum flow. However, under a probabilistic setting, finding the expected maximum flow of a graph is -complete. This is true even if all links have unit weight (that is, a connectivity problem), and even if the graphs are planar. It is important to note that although one is not directly required to compute the exact value of the expected maximum flow in order to find the most vulnerable location, and, in some cases, one can compare the effects of two locations without such computation (e.g., when the failure probability of one location dominates the other), in the general case, such computation is necessary (e.g., two locations affecting disjoint sets of links, and there is no third location that can be used for comparison). Thus, we obtain the following result, whose complete proof appears in the technical report [4] due to lack of space. 
Theorem 7:
Computing the most vulnerable location in terms of expected maximum flow is -complete. Proof: (Sketch). The proof is by reduction from the expected maximum flow problem where one needs to compute the expected maximum flow from node to node . We restrict our graph edges to have capacity 1 and all edge failure probabilities to be the same (in our case, 1/2). It is known that the problem is still -complete [8] . In addition, by enumerating over all possible combinations, and since for each instance the maximum flow is integral, one can verify that the value of the expectation is a multiple of . Trivially, the expected maximum flow is bounded by .
For each possible value of the expected maximum flow, we will construct a specific graph so that by finding the most vulnerable location in this graph (in terms of expected flow), one can determine whether the value of the expected flow on the original graph is more or less than . Hence, by a binary search on the family of these graphs, one can compute the exact value of the of the expected flow on the original graph, establishing that finding the most vulnerable location is in . Note that our family contains an exponential number of graphs (each of polynomial size). However we need to consider only a polynomial number of them (and can construct them on-the-fly). The exact construction and the complete proof appears in the technical report [4] .
Essentially, this hardness result implies that finding the most vulnerable location requires an exponential-time algorithm in the number of affected links. Such algorithms might be feasible to implement when the number of these links is bounded by a small constant . The most intuitive approach is by complete state enumeration. Such an algorithm considers one candidate location at a time (obtained by the corresponding arrangement, as in Section IV); each location defines a probabilistic graph where every edge has a failure probability . Let denote the edges with zero failure probability, and the rest of the edges. The algorithm enumerates all subsets of and for each such subset , it first computes the probability for such a failure pattern:
; then, it computes the maximum flow in . The expected maximum flow is , and its computation requires maximum-flow computations. 5 Alternative techniques, such as graph simplification, graph factoring, and inclusion-exclusion based approaches have also been studied [16] . However, all suggested algorithms still require exponential running time.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have obtained numerical results of the algorithms of Section IV for three networks within the continental USA: Level 3's network of 230 links [32] , Qwest's fiber-optic network of 181 links [44] , and XO Communications' long-haul network of 71 links [56] . We used lightpath information (compound components) for the last two (65 lightpaths in case of Qwest's network and 37 for XO). In addition, for Qwest's network, we used the transmission rates of lightpaths to determine their weights. We conducted simulations with five accuracy values for links (simple components) for , i.e., up to two attacks. For lightpaths, we used three values 0.2, 0.35, 0.5 and simulated one attack ( ). For each case, we considered five attack radii, ranging between 60 and 300 miles and two functions: one that decreases linearly with the distance, and the other that follows a Gaussian distribution (see Section III). Fig. 6 shows the change in with attack radius for a linear for both links and lightpaths. We normalized the value of , so that 100% implies the sum of the weights of all network components. Clearly, the marginal gain for increasing the attack radius is limited, and even small attacks of radius 60 mi can cause large damage if they are placed in vulnerable locations. Moreover, increasing to just two causes more than 1.5 times the number of links to fail indicating that there are multiple locations with similarly high impact. Fig. 7 depicts examples of best single attack locations on Qwest's network for a Gaussian on links and various radii.
We also compared for different values of . Table I shows the results for links and lightpaths when the attack radius (resp., standard deviation) is 180 mi for the linear (resp., Gaussian) -function. Here, and respectively denote under linear and Gaussian -functions. Our results show no perceptible change in when is changed, neither for links nor for lightpaths. This conclusion holds for all three networks, for both -functions and for various attack radii. This may be due to the fact that, in these networks, the locations found lie extremely close to a link, and in many cases close to a node, avoiding the worst case (in terms of accuracy).
However, there do exist cases where varies significantly with : In Fig. 8 To validate our algorithm, we also computed for all three networks when attack locations are restricted to a fine grid of cell size 0.6 0.6 mi . Fig. 4(c) shows the effects on Qwest's network, of attacks of radius 180 mi centered at grid points. The point corresponding to the maximum value of lies less than 0.5 mi from our algorithm's output [shown in red in Fig. 4(c) ] and the values of are also almost the same. These results further reinforce the conclusion that our algorithm is, in practice, close to optimal.
Finally, we compared the total number of locations examined by MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION as well as the actual execution times for all values of . Fig. 9 shows the results for Qwest's network for three attack radii. We see that the complexity of the arrangement as well as the execution times for smaller values of are far higher than that for larger values showing that using larger values provides large reductions in running time with minimal loss of accuracy.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we provided a unified framework to identify vulnerable point(s), given a WDM network embedded in the Euclidean plane. A unique feature of our framework is its ability to cope with a wide range of probabilistic attack and failure models.
The basic building block of our framework is the algorithm MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION, which locates efficiently a point in the plane that causes arbitrarily close to maximum expected damage on a network comprised of simple components. By its tolerance factor , MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION trades accuracy with running time. We further extended and improved MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION in various ways that allow it to deal with compound components, simultaneous attacks, and networks equipped with a protection plan, and to deal faster with simpler networks or distributions. We also evaluated its performance by simulation on three real WDM networks. Our numerical results show, quite surprisingly, that MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION finds a location very close to optimal, even when taking a high tolerance factor (e.g., when it runs very fast but with a loose guarantee on the quality of its output). This makes MAXEXPECTEDDAMAGELOCATION an even more attractive tool for assessing network resilience.
Future research directions include adapting our algorithms to more sophisticated protection techniques, developing efficient planning methods for geographically resilient networks, and investigating the effect of adding minimal infrastructure (e.g., lighting up dark fibers) on network resilience, as well as proving hardness results for approximation schemes. Moreover, we plan to determine how to use low-cost shielding for existing components to mitigate large-scale physical attacks.
